A Framework for Decision-Theoretic Planning I: Combining the Situation
  Calculus, Conditional Plans, Probability and Utility by Poole, David L.
436 Poole 
A Framework for Decision-Theoretic Planning 1: Combining the Situation 
Calculus, Conditional Plans, Probability and Utility* 
David Poole 
Department of Computer Science 
University of British Columbia 
Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z4 
poole@cs.ubc.ca 
http://www.cs.ubc.ca/spider/poole 
Abstract 
This paper shows how we can combine logical 
representations of actions and decision theory in 
such a manner that seems natural for both. In par­
ticular we assume an axiomatization of the do­
main in terms of situation calculus, using what 
is essentially Reiter's solution to the frame prob­
lem, in terms of the completion of the axioms 
defining the state change. Uncertainty is handled 
in terms of the independent choice logic, which 
allows for independent choices and a logic pro­
gram that gives the consequences of the choices. 
As part of the consequences are a specification 
of the utility of (final) states. The robot adopts 
robot plans, similar to the GO LOG programming 
language. Within this logic, we can define the 
expected utility of a conditional plan, based on 
the axiomatization of the actions, the uncertainty 
and the utility. The 'planning' problem is to find 
the plan with the highest expected utility. This 
is related to recent structured representations for 
POMDPs; here we use stochastic situation cal­
culus rules to specify the state transition func­
tion and the reward/value function. Finally we 
show that with stochastic frame axioms, actions 
representations in probabilistic STRIPS are expo­
nentially larger than using the representation pro­
posed here. 
1 Introduction 
The combination of decision theory and planning is very ap­
pealing. Since the combination was advocated in [Feldman 
and Sproull, 1975], there has been a recent revival of inter­
est. The general idea of planning is to construct a sequence 
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of steps, perhaps conditional on observations that solves a 
goaL In decision-theoretic planning, this is generalised to 
the case where there is uncertainty about the environment 
and we are concerned, not only with solving a 'goal', but 
what happens under any of the contingencies. Goal solving 
is extended to the problem of maximizing the agent's ex­
pected utility, where here the utility is an arbitrary function 
of the final state. 
Recently there have been claims made that Markov deci­
sion processes (MOPs) [Puterman, 1990] are the appropri­
ate framework for developing decision theoretic planners 
(e.g., [Boutilier andPuterman, l995;Deanetal., 1993]). In 
MDPs the idea is to construct policies- functions from ob­
served state into actions that maximise long run cumulative 
(usually discounted) reward. It is wrong to equate decision 
theory with creating policies; decision theory can be used to 
select plans, and policies can be considered independently 
of decision theory [Schoppers, 1987]. Even when solving 
partially observable MOPs (POMDPs), where a policy is a 
function from belief states into actions, it is often more con­
venient to use a policy tree [Kaelbling et al., 1996], which is 
much more like a robot plan as developed here- see Sec­
tion 7. 
Rather than assuming robots have policies [Poole, 1995c], 
we can instead consider robot plans as in GOLOG 
[Levesque et al., 1996]. These plans consider sequences 
of steps, with conditions and loops, rather than reactive 
strategies. In this paper we restrict ourselves to conditional 
plans; we do not consider loops or nondeterministic choice, 
although these also could be considered (see Section 6). 
Unlike GOLOG, and like Levesque [1996], the conditions 
in the branching can be 'observations' about the world or 
values received by sensors 
As in GO LOG, we assume that the effects of actions are rep­
resented in the situation calculus. In particular we adopt Re­
iter's [1991] solution to the frame problem. Our represen­
tation is simpler in that we do not assume that actions have 
preconditions - all actions can be attempted at any time, 
the effects of these actions can depend on what else is true 
in the world. This is important because the agent may not 
know whether the preconditions of an action hold, but, for 
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example, may be sure enough to want to try the action. 
All of the uncertainty in our rules is relegated to in­
dependent choices as in the independent choice logic 
[Poole, 1995b] (an extension of probabilistic Horn abduc­
tion [Poole, 1993]). This allows for a clean separation of 
the completeness assumed by Reiter's solution to the frame 
problem and the uncertainty we need for decision theory. 
Before we describe the theory there are some design choices 
incorporated into the framework: 
• In the deterministic case, the trajectory of actions by 
the (single) agent up to some time point determines 
what is true at that point. Thus, the trajectory of ac­
tions, as encapsulated by the 'situation' term of the sit­
uation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; Reiter, 
1991] can be used to denote the state, as is done in the 
traditional situation calculus. However, when dealing 
with uncertainty, the trajectory of an agent's actions up 
to a point, does not uniquely determine what is true 
at that point. What random occurrences or exogenous 
events occurred also determines what is true. We have 
a choice: we can keep the semantic conception of a sit­
uation (as a state) and make the syntactic characteriza­
tion more complicated by perhaps interleaving exoge­
nous actions, or we can keep the simple syntactic form 
of the situation calculus, and use a different notion that 
prescribes truth values. We have chosen the latter, and 
distinguish the 'situation' denoted by the trajectory of 
actions, from the 'state' that specifies what is true in 
the situation. In general there will be a probability dis­
tribution over states resulting from a set of actions by 
the agent. It is this distribution over states, and their 
corresponding utility, that we seek to model. 
This division means that agent's actions are treated 
very differently from exogenous actions that can also 
change what is true. The situation terms define only 
the agent's actions in reaching that point in time. The 
situation calculus tenns indicate only the trajectory, in 
terms of steps, of the agent and essentially just serve to 
delimit time points at which we want to be able to say 
what holds. 
• When building conditional plans, we have to consider 
what we can condition these plans on. We assume that 
the agent has passive sensors, and that it can condition 
its actions on the output of these sensors. We only have 
one sort of action, and these actions only affect 'the 
world' (which includes both the robot and the environ­
ment). All we need to do is to specify how the agent's 
sensors depend on the world. This does not mean that 
we cannot model information-producing actions (e.g., 
looking in a particular place)- these information pro­
ducing actions produce effects that make the sensor 
values correlate with what is true in the world. The 
sensors can be noisy- the value they return does not 
necessarily correspond with what is true in the world 
(of course if there was no correlation with what is true 
in the world, they would not be very useful sensors). 
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Figure I: The example robot environment 
• When mixing logic and probability, one can extend a 
rich logic with probability, and have two sorts of un­
certainty- that uncertainty from the probabilities and 
that from disjunction in the logic [Bacchus, 1990]. An 
alternative that is pursued in the independent choice 
logic is to have all of the uncertainty in terms of prob­
abilities. The logic is restricted so that there is no un­
certainty in the logic - every set of sentences has a 
unique model. In particular we choose the logic of 
acyclic logic programs under the stable model seman­
tics; this seems to be the strongest practical language 
with the unique model property. All uncertainty is 
handled by what can be seen as independent stochas­
ti� mechanisms, and a deterministic logic program that 
gives the consequences of the agent's actions and the 
random outcomes. In this manner we can get a simple 
mix oflogic and Bayesian decision theory (see [Poole, 
1995b]). 
• Unlike in Markov decision processes, where there is a 
reward for each state and utilities accumulate, we as­
sume that an agent carries out a plan, and receives util­
ity depending on the state it ends up in. This is done to 
simplify the formalism, and seems natural. This does 
not mean that we cannot model cases where an agent 
receives rewards and costs along the way, but the re­
wards accumulated then have to be part of the state. 
Note that MOPs also need to make the cumulative re­
ward part of the state to model non-additive rewards 
such as an agent receiving or paying interest on its cur­
rent utility. This also means that we cannot optimize 
ongoing processes that never halt- in fact the acyclic 
restriction in the language means that we cannot model 
such ongoing processes without inventing an arbitrary 
stopping criteria (e.g., stop after 3 years). 
We use the following ongoing example to show the power 
of the fonnalism; it is not intended to be realistic. 
Example 1.1 Suppose we have a robot that can travel 
around an office building, pick up keys, unlock doors, and 
sense whether the key is at the location it is currently at. In 
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the domain depicted in Figure 1, we assume we want to en­
ter the lab, and there is uncertainty about whether the door 
is locked or not, and uncertainty about where the key is (and 
moreover the probabilities are not independent). There are 
also stairs that the robot can fall down, but it can choose to 
go around the long way rather and avoid the stairs. The util­
ity of a plan depends on whether it gets into the lab, whether 
it falls down the stairs and the resources used. 
2 The Situation Calculus and a Solution to 
the Frame Problem 
Before we introduce the probabilistic framework we 
present the situation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969] 
and a simple solution to the frame problem due to Kowalski 
[Kowalski, 1979], Schubert [Schubert, 1990] and Reiter 
[Reiter, 1991]. 
The general idea is that robot actions take the world from 
one 'situation' to another situation. We assume there is 
a situation s0 that is the initial situation, and a function 
do( A, S) 1 that given action A and a situation S returns the 
resulting situation. 
Example 2.1 do(goto(roomlll), so) is a situation result­
ing from the agent attempting to go to room 111 from situ­
ation s0. do(pickup(key), do(goto(roomlll), s0)) is the 
situation resulting from the agent attempting to pick up a 
key after it has attempted to go to room 111. 
For this paper a situation is defined in terms of the s0 con­
stant and the do function. An agent that knows what it has 
done, knows what situation it is in. It however does not nec­
essarily know what is true in that situation. The robot may 
be uncertain about what is true in the initial situation, what 
the effects of its actions are and what exogenous events oc­
curred. 
We model all randomness as independent stochastic mech­
anisms, such that an external viewer that knew the initial 
state (i.e., what is true in the situation s0), and knew how the 
stochastic mechanisms resolved themselves would be able 
to predict what was true in any situation. Given a probabil­
ity distribution over the stochastic mechanisms, we have a 
probability distribution over the effects of actions. 
We will use logic to specify the transitions specified by ac­
tions and thus what is true in a situation. What is true in 
a situation depends on the action attempted, what was true 
before and what stochastic mechanism occurred. A fluent 
is a predicate (or function) whose value depends on the sit­
uation; we will use the situation as the last argument to the 
predicate (function). We assume that for each fluent we can 
axiomatise in what situations it is true based on the action 
that was performed, what was true in the previous state and 
the outcome of the stochastic mechanism. 
1 We assume the Pro log convention that variables are in upper 
case and constants are in lower case. Free variables in formulae 
are considered to be universally quantified with the widest scope. 
Example 2.2 We can write rules such as, the robot is car­
rying the key after it has (successfully} picked it up: 
carrying(key, do(pickup(key), S)) +­
at(robot, Pos, S) 1\ 
at(key, Pos, S) 1\ 
pickup..succeeds(S). 
Here pi.ckup_succeeds(S) is true if the agent would suc­
ceed if it picks up the key and is false if the agent would fail 
to pick up the key. The agent typically does not know the 
value of pickup_succeeds(S) in situationS, or the position 
of the key. 
The general form of a frame axiom specifies that a fluent 
is true after a situation if it were true before, and the action 
were not one that undid the fluent, and there was no mech­
anism that undid the fluent. 
Example 2.3 The agent is carrying the key as long as the 
action was not to put down the key or pick up the key, and 
the agent did not accidentally drop the key while carrying 
out another action2: 
carrying( key, do(A, S)) +­
carrying( key, S) 1\ 
A i- putdown(key) 1\ 
A i- pickup( key) 1\ 
keeps_carrying(key, S). 
Like pickup_succeeds(S) m Example 2.2, 
keeps_carrying(key, S) may be something that the 
agent does not know whether it is true - there may be a 
probability that the agent will drop the key. This thus forms 
a stochastic frame axiom. Note that the same mechanism 
that selects between dropping the key and keeping on 
carrying the key may also have other effects. 
We assume that the clauses are acyclic [Apt and Bezem, 
1991]. Recursion is allowed but all recursion much be well 
founded. The clauses represent the complete description of 
when the predicate will hold. 
3 The Independent Choice Logic 
The Independent Choice Logic specifies a way to build pos­
sible worlds. Possible worlds are built by choosing propo­
sitions from independent alternatives, and then extending 
these 'total choices' with a logic program. This section de­
fines the logic ICLsc· 
2Note that A ¥-pickup( key) is a condition here to cover the 
case where the robot is holding the key and attempts to pick it up. 
With the inequality the robot has the same chance of succeeding 
as a pickup action when the agent is not holding the key. Without 
this condition, the agent would not be holding the key only if it 
dropped the key and the pickup failed. 
Note that a possible world correspond to a complete history. 
A possible world will specify what is true in each situation. 
In other words, given a possible world and a situation, we 
can determine what is true in that situation. We define the 
independent choice logic without reference to situations -
the logic programs will refer to situations. 
There are two languages we will use: LF which, for this 
paper, is the language of acyclic logic programs [Apt and 
Bezem, 1991], and the language LQ of queries which we 
take to be arbitrary propositional formulae (the atoms cor­
responding to ground atomic formulae of the language LF ). 
We write f r.- q where f E LF and q E LQ if q is true in 
the unique stable model off or, equivalently, if q follows 
from Clark's completion of q (the uniqueness of the stable 
model and the equivalence for acyclic programs are proved 
in [Apt and Bezem, 1991]). See [Poole, 1995al for a de­
tailed analysis of negation as failure in this framework, and 
for an abductive characterisation of the logic. 
Definition 3.1 A choice space is a set of sets of ground 
atomic formulae, such that if cl' and c2 are in the choice 
space, and C1 i= C2 then C1 n C2 = {}. An element of 
a choice space is called a choice alternative (or sometimes 
just an alternative). An element of a choice alternative is 
called an atomic choice. An atomic choice can appear in at 
most one alternative.3 
Definition 3.2 An ICLsc theory is a tuple 
{Co, A, 0, Po, F) where 
C0 called nature's choice space, is the choice space of al­
ternatives controlled by nature. 
A called the action space, is a set of primitive actions that 
the agent can perform. 
0 the observables is a set of terms. 
P0 is a function UCo � [0, 1] such that VC E C0, 
L::cEC Po(c) = 1. I.e., Po is a probability measure 
over the alternatives controlled by nature. 
F called the facts, is an acyclic logic program [Apt and 
Bezem, 19911 such that no atomic choice (in an ele­
ment of C0) unifies with the head of any rule. 
The independent choice logic specifies a particular seman­
tic construction. The semantics is defined in terms of pos­
sible worlds. There is a possible world for each selection 
of one element from each alternative. What follows from 
these atoms together with :Fare true in this possible world. 
3 Alternatives correspond to 'variables' in decision theory. 
This terminology is not used here in order to not confuse logical 
variables (that are allowed as part of the logic program), and ran­
dom variables. An atomic choice corresponds to an assignment of 
a value to a variable; the above definitionjust treats a variable hav­
ing a particular value as a proposition (not imposing any particu­
lar syntax); the syntactic restrictions and the semantic construction 
ensure that the values of a variable are mutually exclusive and cov­
ering, as well as that the variables are unconditionally independent 
(see [Poole, 1993)) 
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Definition 3.3 If S is a set of sets, a selector function on 
Sis a mapping T : S � US such that T(S) E S for all 
S E S. The range of selector function T, written R(T) is 
the set { T(S) : S E S}. 
Definition 3.4 Given ICLsc theory {C0, A, 0, Po, F), for 
each selector function T on C0 there is a possible world w.,-. 
Iff is a formula in language C.q, and Wr is a possible world, 
we write w.,- f= f (read f is true in possible world Wr) if 
FU 'R(T) 'r-f. 
The existence and uniqueness of the model follows from the 
acyclicity of the logic program [Apt and Bezem, 1991]. 
3.1 Axiomatising utility 
Given the definition of an ICLsc theory, we can write rules 
for utility. We assume that the utility depends on the situa­
tion that the robot ends up in and the possible world. In par­
ticular we allow for rules that imply utility(U, S), which is 
true in a possible world if the utility is U for situation S in 
that world. The utility depends on what is true in the state 
defined by the situation and the world- thus we write rules 
that imply utility. This allows for a structured representa­
tion for utility. In order to make sure that we can interpret 
these rules as utilities we need to have utility being func­
tional: for each S there exists a unique U for each world: 
Definition 3.5 An ICLsc theory is utility complete if for 
each possible world w.,-, and each situation S there is a 
unique number U such that wT f= utility(U, S). 
Ensuring utility completeness can be done locally; we have 
to make sure that the rules for utility cover all of the cases 
and there are not two rules that imply different utilities 
whose bodies are compatible. 
Example 3.6 Suppose the utility is the sum of the 'prize' 
plus the remaining resources: 
utility(R + P, S) � 
prize(P, S) I\ 
resources(R, S). 
The prize depends on whether the robot reached its destina­
tion or it crashed. No matter what the definition of any other 
predicates is, the following definition of prize will ensure 
there is a unique prize for each world and situation4: 
prize( -1000, S) � crashed(S). 
prize(lOOO, S) -i- in_lab(S) I\ "'crashed(S). 
prize(O, S) � .....,inJab(S) I\ .....,crashed(S). 
The resources used depends not only on the final state but on 
the route taken. To model this we make resources a fluent, 
4We use'..._,' to mean negation under Clark completion [Clark, 
1978], or in the stable model semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 
1988]- these and other semantics for so-called negation as fail­
ure coincide for acyclic theories [Apt and Bezem, 1991). 
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and like any other fluent we axiomatise it: 
resources(200, so). 
resources(R- Cost, do(goto(To, Route), S) )  t­
at( robot, From, S) 1\ 
path( From, To, Route, Risky, Cost) 1\ 
resources(R, S) . 
resources(R, do(goto(To, Route), S)) t­
crashed(S) 1\ 
resources(R, S) . 
resources(R- 10, do(A, S)) t­
"'gotoaction(A) 1\ 
resources(R, S). 
gotoaction(goto(A, S)) . 
Here we have assumed that non-goto actions cost 10, and 
that paths have costs. Paths and their risks and costs are 
axiomatised using path( From, To, Route, Risky, Cost) 
that is true if the path from From to To via Route has risk 
given by Risky can cost Cost. An example of this for our 
domain is: 
path(riOl, rlll, direct, yes, 10). 
path(rlOl, rlll, long, no, 100). 
path(riOl, r123, direct, yes, 50). 
path(riOl, r123, long, no, 90). 
path(riOl, door, direct, yes, 50). 
path(r101, door, long, no, 70). 
3.2 Axiomatising Sensors 
We also need to axiomatise how sensors work. We assume 
that sensors are passive; this means that they receive infor­
mation from the environment, rather than 'doing' anything; 
there are no sensing 'actions'. This seems to be a better 
model of actual sensors, such as eyes or ears, and makes 
modelling simpler than when sensing is an action. So called 
'information producing actions' (such as opening the eyes, 
or performing a biopsy on a patient, or exploding a parcel 
to see if it is (was) a bomb) are normal actions that are de­
signed to change the world so that the sensors will correlate 
with the value of interest. Note that under this view, there 
are no information producing actions, or even informational 
effects of actions; rather various conditions in the world, 
some of which are under the robot's control and some of 
which are not, work together to give varying values for the 
output of sensors. 
Note that a robot cannot condition its action on what is true 
in the world; it can only condition its actions on what it 
senses and what it remembers. The only use for sensors is 
that the output of a sensor depends, perhaps stochastically, 
on what is true in the world, and thus can be used as evi­
dence for what is true in the world. 
Within our situation calculus framework, can write axioms 
to specify how sensed values depend on what is true in 
the world. What is sensed depends on the situation and 
the possible world. We assume that there is a predicate 
sense(C, S) that is true if Cis sensed in situationS. Here 
C is a term in our language, that represents one value for 
the output of a sensor. C is said to be observable. 
Example 3.7 A sensor may be to be able to detect whether 
the robot is at the same position as the key. It is nm :�liable; 
sometimes it says the robot is at the same position as �'"-e 
key when it is not (a false positive), and sometimes it says 
that the robot is not at the same position when it is (a false 
negative). The output of the sensor is correlated with what 
is true in the world, and can be conditioned on in plans. 
Suppose that noisy sensor aLkey detects whether the agent 
is at the same position as· the key. For a situation s, 
sense(at_key, s) is true (in a world) if the robot senses that 
it is at the key in situation s- the 'at key' sensor returns a 
positive value- and is false when the robot does not sense 
it is at the key - the sensor returns a negative value. The 
sense(at_key, S) relation can be axiomatised as: 
sense(aLkey, S) t­
at(robot, P, S) 1\ 
at(key, P, S) 1\ 
sensor _true_pos(S). 
sense(aLkey, S) t­
at(robot, P1, S) 1\ 
at( key, P2, S) 1\ 
pl f:. p2 1\ 
sensor _false_pos(S). 
The fluent sensor _false_pos(S) is true if the sen­
sor is giving a false-positive value in situation S, and 
sensor _true_pos(S) is true if the sensor is not giving a 
false negative in situationS. Each of these could be part of 
an atomic choice, which would let us model sensors whose 
errors at different times are independent. The language 
also lets us write rules for this fluent so that we can model 
how sensors break. 
4 GOLOG and Conditional Plans 
The idea behind the decision-theoretic planning framework 
proposed in this paper is that agents get to choose situations 
(they get to choose what they do, and when they stop), and 
'nature' gets to choose worlds (there is a probability distri­
bution over the worlds that specifies the distribution of ef­
fects of the actions). 
Agents get to choose situations, but they do not have to 
choose situations blind. We assume that agents can sense 
the world, and choose their actions conditional on what they 
observe. Moreover agents can have sequences of acting and 
observing. 
Agents do not directly adopt situations, they adopt 'plans' 
or 'programs'. In general these programs can involve 
atomic actions, conditioning on observations, loops, nonde­
terministic choice and procedural abstraction. The GO LOG 
project [Levesque et al., 1996] is investigating such pro­
grams. In this paper we only consider simple conditional 
plans which are programs consisting only of sequential 
composition and conditioning on observations. One contri­
bution of this paper is to show how conditioning future ac­
tions on observations can be cleanly added to GOLOG (in 
a similar manner to the independently developed robot pro­
grams of [Levesque, 1996]). 
An example plan is: 
a; if c then b else d; e endlf; g 
An agent executing this plan will start in situation so, then 
do action a, then it will sense whether c is true in the re­
sulting situation. If c is true, it will do b then g, and if c 
is false it will do d then e then g. Thus this plan either 
selects the situation do(g, do(b, do( a, s0))) or the situation 
do(g,do(e,do(d,do(a,s0)))). It selects the former in all 
worlds where sense( c, do( a, s0)) is true, and selects the lat­
ter in all worlds where sense(c, do( a, so)) is false. Note 
that each world is definitive on each fluent for each situa­
tion. The expected utility of this plan is the weighted av­
erage of the utility for each of the worlds and the situation 
chosen for that world. The only property we need of cis that 
its value in situation do( a, s0) will be able to be observed. 
The agent does not need to be able to determine its value 
beforehand. 
Definition 4.1 A conditional plan, or just a plan, is of the 
form 
skip 
A where A is a primitive action 
P; Q where P and Q are plans 
if C then P else Q endlf 
where C is observable; P and Q are plans 
Note that 'skip' is not an action; the skip plan means that 
the agent does not do anything- time does not pass. This is 
introduced so that the agent can stop without doing anything 
(this may be a reasonable plan), and so we do not need an "if 
C then P endlf" form as well; this would be an abbreviation 
for "if C then P else skip endlf". 
Plans select situations in worlds. We define a relation 
trans(P, W, S1, S2) 
that is true if doing plan p in world w from situation sl 
results in situation S2. This is similar to the DO macro in 
[Levesque et al., 1996] and the Rdo of [Levesque, 1996], 
but here what the agent does depends on what it observes, 
and what the agent observes depends on which world it hap­
pens to be in. 
We can define the trans relation in pseudo Pro log as: 
trans(skip, W, S, S). 
A Framework for Decision-Theoretic Planning 441 
trans(A, W,S,do(A,S)) +­
primitive(A). 
trans((P;Q), W,S1.S3) +­
trans(P, W, S1, Sz) /1. 
trans(Q, W, Sz, 83). 
trans((if c then p else Q endif), w, sl' 52) +­
w � sense(C, Sl) 1\ 
trans(P, W, St, Sz). 
trans ((if C then P else Q endif), W, S 1, 82) +­
W � sense(C , Sl) /1. 
trans(Q, W, St, Sz). 
Now we are at the stage where we can define the expected 
utility of a plan. The expected utility of a plan is the 
weighted average, over the set of possible worlds, of the 
utility the agent receives in the situation it ends up in for 
that possible world: 
Definition 4.2 If ICLsc theory (Co, A, 0, Po, F) is utility 
complete, the expected utility of plan P is5: 
T 
(summing over all selector functions T on C0) where 
u(W, P) = U if W � utility(U, S) 
where trans(P, W, s0, S) 
(this is well defined as the theory is utility complete), and 
p(w,.) == II Po(Co) 
CoER(T) 
u(W, P) is the utility of plan P in world W. p( w,.) is the 
probability of world w,.. The probability is the product of 
the independent choices of nature. It is easy to show that 
this induces a probability measure (the sum of the probabil­
ities of the worlds is 1). 
5 Details of our Example 
We can model dependent uncertainties. Suppose we are un­
certain about whether the door is locked, and where the key 
is, and suppose that these are not independent, with the fol­
lowing probabilities: 
P(locked(door, so)) 
= 0.9 
P(at(key, rlOl, so)llocked(door, so)) = 0.7 
P(at(key, rlOl, s0)junlocked(door, so)) = 0.2 
(from which we conclude P(aLkey(rlOl, s0)) = 0.65.) 
5We need a slightly more complicated construction when we 
have infinitely many worlds. We need to define probability over 
measurable subsets of the worlds [Poole, 1993], but that would 
only complicate this presentation. 
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Following the methodology outlined in [Poole, 1993] this 
can be modelled as: 
random([locked(door, so) : 0.9, 
unlocked( door, so) : 0.1]). 
random([aLkey_lo(rlOl, s0) : 0.7, 
at_key_lo(key, r1 23) : 0.3]). 
random([aLkey�unlo(rlOl, s0) : 0.2, 
at_key�unlo(key, rl23) : 0.8]). 
at( key, R, so) +-
aLkey_lo(R, so) 1\ 
locked( door, s0). 
at( key, R, sa) +-
at_key_unlo(R, so) 1\ 
unlocked( door, so). 
where random((a1 PI, ... , an Pn]) means 
{a1, ... ,an} E Co and Po(ai) = p;. This is the syntax 
used by our implementation. 
We can model complex stochastic actions using the same 
mechanism. The action goto is risky; whenever the robot 
goes past the stairs there is a 10% chance that it will fall 
down the stairs. 
This is modelled with the choice alternatives: 
random([would_jall..down_stairs(S) : 0.1, 
would_noLjall..down_stairs(S) : 0.9]). 
which means 
\IS { would_Jall..down_stairs(S), 
would_noLjall..down_stairs(S)} E Co 
\IS P0(would_jall..down_stairs(S)) = 0.1 
These atomic choices are used in the bodies of rules. We 
can define the propositional fluent 'at': 
at(robot, To, do(goto(To, Route), S)) +­
at( robot, From, S) 1\ 
path(From, To, Route, no, Cost). 
at( robot, To, do(goto(To, Route), S)) +­
at(robot, From, S) 1\ 
path( From, To, Route , yes, Cost) 1\ 
would_not_jall_down_stairs(S). 
at( robot, Pos, do( A, S)) +­
�gotoaction(A) 1\ 
at( robot, Pos, S). 
at( X, P, S) +-
X =f robot 1\ 
carrying( robot, X, S) 1\ 
at(robot, P, S). 
at( X, Pos, do( A, S)) +-
X :/= robot 1\ 
�carrying(robot, X, S) 1\ 
at(X, Pos, S). 
In those worlds where the path is risky and the agent would 
fall down the stairs, then it crashes: 
crashed( do( A, S)) +­
crashed(S). 
crashed(do(A, S)) +­
risky(A, S) 1\ 
would_f all Jlown_stair s( S). 
risky(goto(To, Route), S) +­
path(From, To, Route, yes,_) 1\ 
at( robot, From, S). 
An example plan is: 
goto(r101, direct); 
if at_key 
then 
else 
endlf; 
unlock_door; 
enter _lab 
pickup( key); 
goto(door, long) 
goto(r1 23, direct); 
pickup( key); 
goto(door, direct) 
Given the situation calculus axioms (not all were pre­
sented), and the choice space, this plan has an expected 
utility. This is obtained by deriving utility(U, S) for each 
world that is selected by the plan, and using a weighted av­
erage over the utilities derived. The possible worlds corre­
spond to choices of elements from alternatives. We do not 
need to generate the possible worlds- only the 'explana­
tions' of the utility [Poole, l995a]. For example, in all of 
the worlds where the following is true, 
{locked( door, s0), at( key, r101, s0), 
would_not_f alLdown_stair s( so), 
sensor _true_pos(do(goto(rl01, direct), s0) ), 
pickup_succeeds(do(goto(r101, direct), s0))} 
the sensing succeeds (and so the 'then' part of the condi­
tion is chosen), the prize is 1000, and the resources left are 
the initial200, minus the 10 going from rlll to rlOl, mi­
nus the 70 going to the door, minus the 30 for the other 
three actions. Thus the resulting utility if 10 90. The sum 
of the probabilities for all of these worlds is the product of 
the probabilities of the choices made. 
Similarly all of the the possible worlds with 
would_] alLdown_stair s( so) true have prize -1000, 
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and resources 190, and thus have utility -810. The 
probability of all of these worlds sums to 0.1. 
The expected utility of this plan can be computed by enu­
merating the other cases. 
6 Richer Plan Language 
There are two notable deficiencies in our definition of a 
plan; these were omitted in order to make the presentation 
simpler. 
1. Our programs do not contain loops. 
2. There are no local variables; all of the internal state of 
the robot is encoded in the program counter. 
One way to extend the language to include iteration in plans, 
is by adding a construction such as 
while C do P endDo 
as a plan (where C is observable and Pis a plan), with the 
corresponding definition of trans being6: 
trans((while C do P endDo), W, 51, 51) +­
W f= sense(C,51)· 
trans((while C do P endDo), W, 51, 53) +­
W f= sense(C, 51) 1\ 
trans(P, W, 51, 52) 1\ 
trans((while C do P endDo), W, 52, 53)· 
This would allow for interesting programs including loops 
such as 
while everything_ok do wait endDo 
(where wait has no effects) which is very silly for deter­
ministic programs, but is perfectly sensible in stochastic do­
mains, where the agent loops until an exogenous event oc­
curs that stops everything being OK. This is not part of the 
current theory as it violates utility completeness, however, 
for many domains, the worlds where this program does not 
halt have measure zero- as long as the probability of fail­
ure> 0, given enough time something will always break 
Local variables can easily be added to the definition of a 
plan. For example, we can add an assignment statement to 
assign local variables values, and allow for branching on the 
values of variables as well as observations. This (and allow­
ing for arithmetic values and operators) will expand the rep­
resentational power of the language (see [Levesque, 1996] 
for a discussion of this issue). 
"Note that we really need a second-order definition, as in 
[Levesque, 1996], to properly define the trans relation ratherthan 
the recursive definition here. This will let us characterize loop 
termination. 
The addition of local variables will make some programs 
simpler, such as those programs where the agent is to condi­
tion on previous values for a sensor. For example, suppose 
the robot's sensor can tell whether a door is unlocked a long 
time before it is needed. With local variables, whether the 
door is unlocked can be remembered. Without local vari­
ables, that information needs to be encoded in the program 
counter; this can be done by branching on the sense value 
when it is sensed, and having different branches depending 
on whether the door was open or not. 
7 Comparison with Other Representations 
One of the popular action representations for stochastic ac­
tions is probabilistic STRIPS [Kushmerick et al., 1995; 
Draper et al., 1994; Boutilier and Dearden, 1994; Had­
dawy et al., 1995]. In this section we show that the pro­
posed representation is more concise in the sense that the 
ICLscrepresentation will not be (more than a constant fac­
tor) larger than then corresponding probabilistic STRIPS 
representation plus a rule for each predicate, but that some­
times probabilistic STRIPS representation will be exponen­
tially larger than the corresponding ICLsc representation. 
It is easy to translate probabilistic STRIPS into ICLsc: us­
ing the notation of [Kushmerick et al., 1995], each action a 
is represented as a set { ( ti, p;, e;)}. Each tuple can be trans­
lated into the rule of form: 
(f[5] means the state term is added to every atomic formula 
in formula f), where b; is a unique predicate symbol, the 
different ri for the same trigger are collected into an alter­
native set, such that Po ( r i ( 5)) = p; for all S. For those 
positive elements p of e;, we have a rule: 
p[do(a, 5)] +- b;(a, 5) 
For those negative elements p of e; we have the rule, 
undoes(p, a, 5) +- b;(a, 5) 
and the frame rule for each predicate: 
p[do(A, 5)] +- p(S) 1\ '""undoes(p, A, 5). 
The ICLsc action representation is much more modular for 
some problems than probabilistic STRIPS. As in STRIPS, 
the actions have to be represented all at once. Probabilistic 
STRIPS is worse than the ICLsc representation when ac­
tions effect fluents independently. At one extreme (where 
the effect does not depend on the action), consider stochas­
tic 'frame axioms' such as the axiom for carrying pre­
sented in Example 2.3. In probabilistic STRIPS the condi­
tional effects have to be added to every tuple representing 
an action - in terms of [Kushmerick et al., 1995], for ev­
ery trigger that is compatible with carrying the key, we have 
to split into the cases where the agent drops the key and the 
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agent doesn't. Thus the probabilistic STRIPS representa­
tion grows exponentially with the number of independent 
stochastic frame axioms: consider n fluents which persist 
stochastically and independently and the wait action, with 
no effects. The lCLsc representation is linear in the number 
of fluents, whereas the probabilistic STRIPS representation 
is exponential in n. Note that if the persistence of the fluents 
are not independent, then the ICLsc representation will also 
be the exponential in n - we cannot get better than this; 
the number of probabilities that have to be specified is also 
exponential in  n. In some sense we are exploiting the con­
ciseness of Bayesian networks - together with structured 
probability tables (see [Poole, 1993)) - to specify the de­
pendencies amongst the outcomes. 
The lCLsc representation is closely related to two slice tem­
poral Bayesian networks [Dean and Kanazawa, 1989] or 
the action networks of [Boutilier et at. ,  1995; Boutilier and 
Poole, 1996] that are used for Markov decision processes 
(MDPs). The latter represent in trees what is represented 
here in rules - see [Poole, 1993] for a comparison be­
tween the rule language presented here and Bayesian net­
works. The situation calculus rules can be seen as struc­
tured representations of the state transition function, and the 
rules for utility can be seen as a structured representation 
of the reward or value function. In [Boutilier and Poole, 
1996], this structure is exploited for finding optimal policies 
in partially observable MDPs. A problem with the POMDP 
conception is that it assumes that agents maintain a belief 
state (a probability distribution over possible worlds). In 
order to avoid this, POMDP researchers (see [Kaelbling et 
a!. , 1996]) have proposed 'policy trees ' ,  which correspond 
to the plans developed here. The general idea behind the 
structured POMDP algorithm [Boutilier and Poole, 1996] 
is to use what is essentially regression [Waldinger, 1977] 
on the situation calculus rules to build plans of future ac­
tions contingent on observations - policy trees. The dif­
ficult part for exact computation is to not build plans that 
are stochastically dominated [Kaelbling et al. , 1996]. One 
problem with the action networks is that the problem repre­
sentations grow with the product of the number of actions 
and the number of state variables - this is exactly the frame 
problem [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969] that is 'solved' here 
using Reiter's solution [Reiter, 1991]; if the number of ac­
tions that affect a fluent is bounded, the size of the represen­
tation is proportional the number offluents (state variables). 
In contrast to [Haddawy and Hanks, 1993], we allow a 
general language to specify utility. Utility can be an arbi­
trary function of the final state, and because any information 
about the past can be incorporated into the state, we allow 
the utility to be an arbitrary function of the history. The aim 
of this work is not to identify useful utility functions, but 
rather to give a language to specify utilities. 
The use of probability in this paper should be contrasted 
to that in [Bacchus et al. ,  1995). The agents in the frame­
work presented here do not (have to) do probabilistic rea­
soning. As, for example in MDPs, the probabilistic rea­
soning is about the agent and the environment. An optimal 
agent (or an optimal program for an agent) may maintain 
a belief state that is updated by Bayes rule or some other 
mechanism, but it does not have to. It only has to do the 
right thing. Moreover we let the agent condition its actions 
based on its observations, and not just update its belief state. 
We can also incorporate non-deterministic actions. 
8 Conclusion 
This paper has presented a formalism that lets us combine 
situation calculus axioms, conditional plans and Bayesian 
decision theory in a coherent framework. It is closely re­
lated to structured representations of POMDP problems. 
The hope is that we can form a bridge between work in AI 
planning and in POMDPs, and use the best features of both. 
This is the basis for ongoing research. 
The way we have treated the situation calculus (and we have 
tried hard to keep it as close to the original as possible) re­
ally gives an agent-oriented view of time - the ' situations' 
in some sense mark particular time points that correspond 
to the agent completing its actions. Everything else (e.g., 
actions by nature or other agents) then has to meld in with 
this division of time. Whether this is preferable to a more 
uniform treatment of the agent's actions and other actions 
(see e.g., [Poole, 1995b]) is still a matter of argument. 
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